

Unbalanced Data Classification in Fraud Detection by Introducing a Multidimensional Space Analysis

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Abstract: The problem of frauds is becoming increasingly important in this E-commerce age, where an enormous number of financial transactions are carried out by using electronic instruments of payment such as credit cards. In this scenario it is not possible to adopt human-driven solutions due to the huge number of involved operations. The only approach is therefore to adopt automatic solutions able to discern the legitimate transactions from the fraudulent ones. For this reason, today the development of techniques capable of carrying out this task efficiently represents a very active research field that involves a large number of researchers around the world. Unfortunately, this is not an easy task, since the definition of effective fraud detection approaches is made difficult by a series of well-known problems, the most important of them being the non-balanced class distribution of data that leads towards a significant reduction of the machine learning approaches performance. Such limitation is addressed by the approach proposed in this paper, which exploits three different metrics of similarity in order to define a three-dimensional space of evaluation. Its main objective is a better characterization of the financial transactions in terms of the two possible target classes (legitimate or fraudulent), facing the information asymmetry that gives rise to the problem previously exposed. A series of experiments conducted by using real-world data with different size and imbalance level, demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach with regard to the state-of-the-art solutions.

1 INTRODUCTION

Many studies, such as those conducted by the *Euromonitor International*¹, indicate that the E-commerce growth attracts fraudsters, as shown in Figure 1 that reports the total fraud levels in the Europe, Middle East and Africa (EMEA) areas.

Considering the economic relevance of the frauds events, is more and more crucial the research of effective fraud detection approaches able to face this problem, reducing the economic losses as much as possible. Unfortunately, the development of these approaches has to face some problems, the most important of which is represented by the non-balanced distribution of data Japkowicz and Stephen (2002) that characterizes the information usually available for the definition of fraud detection models.

Other additional problems, such as the *data scarcity* Assis et al. (2010); Ahmed et al. (2016), the *non-adaptability of the detection models* Sorounejad et al. (2016), the *data heterogeneity* Chatterjee and

Segev (1991); Che et al. (2013), or the *cold start* Zhu et al. (2008); Donmez et al. (2007) issue, contribute to making the development of such approaches more difficult.

The literature offers us a number of techniques aimed to detect the *fraudulent* transactions in a financial data flow. Some examples are those based on the: *Data Mining* techniques to generate rules on the basis of fraud patterns Lek et al. (2001); *Artificial Intelligence* techniques to detect anomalies in the data Hoffman and Tensendorf (2005); *Neural Networks* techniques to design predictive models Gopinathan et al. (1998); *Signature-based* techniques able to model the legitimate data Edge and Sampaio (2009); *Fuzzy Logic* techniques that exploit the fuzzy analysis to perform fraud detection tasks Lenard and Alam (2005); *Decision Tree* techniques aimed to reduce the misclassifications Sahin et al. (2013); *Machine Learning* techniques able to generate predictions on the basis of multiple models Whiting et al. (2012); Zhang et al. (2011); *Genetic Programming* techniques that exploit an *Evolutionary*

¹<http://www.euromonitor.com/>




Figure 1: Total Fraud Level in EMEA.

Computation approach in order to detect frauds Assis et al. (2010); *Statistical Inference* techniques able to detect frauds by adopting a Bayesian model Hooi et al. (2016).

One of the limit shared by all these techniques is the strategy they adopt to define an evaluation model, which is usually based on an unique criterion applied on the previous transactions collected by the fraud detection systems. Such a way of proceeding leads towards misclassifications, considering that the available data usually does not contain enough information about all the transaction classes, due to the high level of imbalance that characterizes them.

In several previous works Saia et al. (2015); Saia and Carta (2017a); Saia (2017); Saia and Carta (2017b) we studied the advantages and disadvantages related to the adoption of proactive fraud detection approaches as possible solution to mitigate the aforementioned problems.

The main intuition on which this paper relies is to perform the data analysis in a three-dimensional space, which is given by three different metrics of similarity. The objective we want to achieve is a better characterization (with respect to the state-of-the-art approaches) of each transaction in one of the two possible classes of destination (i.e., *legitimate* or *fraudulent*).

The scientific contributions given by this paper are as follows:

- (i) formalization of three similarity metrics aimed to compare different aspects of two transactions, i.e., *Transactions Global Similarity*, *Features Local Similarity*, and *Features Global Similarity* metrics;
- (ii) definition of a three-dimensional space given by the aforementioned three metrics of similarity, which allows us to well characterize each transaction with respect to the other ones;
- (iii) formulation of an algorithm able to classify each new transaction as *legitimate* or *fraudulent* by performing its evaluation in the previously defined three-dimensional space.

The paper is organized into the following sections: Section 2 introduces the background and related work; Section 3 provides a formal notation and defines the faced problem; Section 4 describes the proposed approach implementation; Section 5 gives details on the experimental environment, on the adopted datasets and metrics, as well as on the used strategy and the competitor approach, concluding by discuss the experimental results; Section 6 provides some concluding remarks and points to some further directions for research.

2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK

This section introduces the fraud detection scenario by starting with the description of strategies and approaches commonly used in this field, together with the most important open problems. It continues by exposing the idea that stands behind the proposed approach, concluding with a description of the state-of-the-art competitor used to evaluate its performance.

2.1 Strategies and Approaches

A fraud detection system can operate by using two different strategies Phua et al. (2010), *supervised* or *unsupervised*:

- in the case of the *supervised* strategy, it takes into account all the previous transactions (i.e., *legitimate* and *fraudulent*) in the process of definition of the evaluation model. Such strategy needs a number of examples related to both the *legitimate* and the *fraudulent* cases, and its capability is limited by the detection of patterns that were present in the data used to train the evaluation model;
- the *unsupervised* strategy instead operates by comparing the values of the features that compose the transaction to evaluate to those present in the *legitimate* cases previously collected by the system. This strategy is often ineffective since many *fraudulent* transactions do not have significant variations in their feature values, with regard to the *legitimate* ones. For this reason the development of fraud detection approaches based on the *unsupervised* strategy is not an easy task Goldstein and Uchida (2016).

Regardless of the adopted strategy, a fraud detection system can instead follow a *static*, *updating*, or *forgetting* operative approach:

- the *static approach* Pozzolo et al. (2014) operates by dividing the data into blocks of equal size and

the evaluation model is defined by taking into account a certain number of initial and contiguous blocks;

- the *updating approach* Wang et al. (2003) operates by updating the evaluation model at each new block by using a defined number of latest and contiguous blocks;
- the *forgetting approach* Gao et al. (2007) operates by updating the evaluation model when a new block appears, by taking into account the *legitimate* transactions in the last two blocks and all the *fraudulent* transactions present in all the blocks.

The evaluation models defined by adopting the aforementioned operative approaches can be used as they are or they can be joined together in order to define a more complex evaluation model.

However, all the approaches lead toward several issues, because the *static approach* is ineffective in the modelization of the users behavior, the *updating approach* is ineffective when working with small amounts of data, and the *forgetting approach* is characterized by an excessive computational complexity.

2.2 Open Problems

This section reports the most common problems related to the fraud detection processes.

2.2.1 Data Scarcity

Frauds represent the biggest problem that affects the E-commerce area, a problem worsened by the *scarcity of real-world datasets* available for the research community Assis et al. (2010); Ahmed et al. (2016), which are essential for the development of new fraud detection techniques. This is a well-known problem related to the restrictive policies commonly adopted by those working in this field, financial operators that for competitive or legal reasons do not want to release information about their business and, above all, about the frauds that they have suffered. It should be added that such information is not even released in anonymous form, since even in this form they may reveal potential vulnerabilities.

2.2.2 Model Non-adaptability

Another problem, which affect both the *supervised* and *unsupervised* approaches, is related to the *non-adaptability of the detection models*. This means that the evaluation models do not lead toward good performance when the transactions to evaluate are characterized by unknown patterns (with regard to those

used to define the evaluation model) Sorournejad et al. (2016).

2.2.3 Data Heterogeneity

The *data heterogeneity* problem is formally defined as the incompatibility between similar features resulting in the same data being represented differently in different datasets Chatterjee and Segev (1991); Che et al. (2013), as it happens in the data involved in the fraud detection processes.

2.2.4 Data Imbalance

Although the problems outlined above are also important, the crucial problem that has to be faced in this field is the *data imbalance*. It is given by the composition of the data available for the evaluation model training, which is usually characterized by a small number of *fraudulent* transactions and a large number of *legitimate* ones.

This adversely affects the performance of the canonical approaches of classification Japkowicz and Stephen (2002); Brown and Mues (2012); He and Garcia (2009), where such problem is usually faced by performing a preliminary balance of data Vinciotti and Hand (2003). It is performed by duplicating some of the transactions that belong to the less numerous class (*over-sampling* strategy) or by removing some of the transactions that belong to the more numerous class (*under-sampling* strategy). The effectiveness of these balancing strategies is analyzed and discussed in Marqués et al. (2013); Crone and Finlay (2012).

2.2.5 Cold-start

Another problem directly related to the *data imbalance* is the *cold-start* one. It happens when the data available for the definition of the evaluation model do not contain enough information on all the classes of data. This prevents the definition of an effective evaluation model, since the available information does not represent all the possible classes of destinations (i.e., in our case, *legitimate* and *fraudulent*) Attenberg and Provost (2010).

2.3 Proposed Approach

The proposed *Multidimensional Similarity Space (MSS)* approach compares the transactions in a three-dimensional space given by three different metrics of similarity. The objective is to achieve a better characterization of each transaction in the context of one of the two possible classifications (i.e., *legitimate* or *fraudulent*).




Figure 2: Three-dimensional Similarity Space.

Such metrics, described in detail later, allow us to evaluate different aspects of the transactions, i.e., the *Transactions Global Similarity (TGS)*, the *Features Local Similarity (TLS)*, and the *Features Global Similarity (FLS)*.

They have been used to define, respectively, the *X*, *Y*, and *Z* dimensions of our three-dimensional space, where the similarity between two transactions is represented as a point placed at the *X*, *Y*, and *Z* coordinates. This is shown in Figure 2, where the multi-dimensional similarity between two transactions has generated a point at the $(X=0.5, Y=0.5, Z=0.5)$ coordinates.

2.4 Competitor Approach

The state-of-the-art competitor we chose to evaluate the performance of the proposed approach is Random Forests Breiman (2001), since it outperforms the other ones Brown and Mues (2012); Bhattacharyya et al. (2011) in the fraud detection field, as indeed experimentally verified in Section Competitor).

Briefly, it works by growing many classification trees, classifying a new transaction (in terms of vector of its features) by putting it at the bottom of each one of the trees in the forest. Each tree provides a classification (votes) and the final classification of the transaction is given by the classification having the most votes in the context of all the trees in the forest.

3 PRELIMINARIES

This section formalizes the notation used in this paper and the problem faced by our approach.

3.1 Formal Notation

Given a set of classified transactions $T = \{t_1, t_2, \dots, t_N\}$, we denote as T_+ the subset of *legitimate* ones (then $T_+ \subseteq T$), and as T_- the subset of *fraudulent* ones (then $T_- \subseteq T$).

Each transaction $t \in T$ is composed by a set of features $V = \{v_1, v_2, \dots, v_M\}$ and each transaction can belong only to one class $c \in C$, where $C = \{\textit{legitimate}, \textit{fraudulent}\}$.

We also denote a set of unclassified transactions $\hat{T} = \{\hat{t}_1, \hat{t}_2, \dots, \hat{t}_U\}$.

The aforementioned notation is for convenience summarized in Table 1.

Table 1: Formal Notation.

Notation	Description
$T = \{t_1, t_2, \dots, t_N\}$	Set of classified transactions
T_+ , with $T_+ \subseteq T$	Subset of legitimate transactions
T_- , with $T_- \subseteq T$	Subset of fraudulent transactions
$V = \{v_1, v_2, \dots, v_M\}$	Set of transaction features
$\hat{T} = \{\hat{t}_1, \hat{t}_2, \dots, \hat{t}_U\}$	Set of unclassified transactions
$C = \{\textit{legitimate}, \textit{fraudulent}\}$	Set of possible classifications

3.2 Problem Definition

Initially, we denote as Φ the process of classification made by our approach, which is aimed to classify an unevaluated transaction $\hat{t} \in \hat{T}$ as *legitimate* or *fraudulent*.

Subsequently, we define a function *Classifier* (\hat{t}, Φ) that returns a boolean value β that indicates the correctness of the performed classification made by Φ for the transaction \hat{t} ($0 = \textit{misclassification}, 1 = \textit{correct classification}$).

Finally, we formalize our problem as maximization of the sum of the values returned by the *Classifier* function, as shown in Equation 1.

$$\max_{0 \leq \beta \leq |\hat{T}|} \beta = \sum_{u=1}^{|\hat{T}|} \textit{Classifier}(\hat{t}_u, \Phi) \quad (1)$$

4 PROPOSED APPROACH

Our approach has been implemented by following the three steps summarized below and detailed later:

1. **Metrics Definition:** definition of three metrics aimed to compare two transactions in terms of different similarity aspects, after we define the nature of the data to be evaluated;

2. **Criteria Formalization:** formalization of criteria used to evaluate a new transaction in a three-dimensional space given by the three metrics of similarity previously defined;
3. **Algorithm Formulation:** formulation of an algorithm based on our *Multidimensional Similarity Space (MSS)* approach, able to classify each new transaction as *legitimate* or *fraudulent*.

4.1 Metrics Definition

This section starts by defining the nature of the data vectors taken into account during the evaluation process, continuing by formalizing the three metrics involved in such process. As introduced in Section 2.3, these metrics give rise to the three-dimensional space used to evaluate the similarity between two transactions, as shown in Figure 2. They represent, respectively, the X , Y , and Z dimensions of this space (i.e., $X=TGS$, $Y=FLS$, and $Z=FGS$).

4.1.1 Data Vectors

Equation 2 shows the matrix given by a series of transactions, which in this case are those in the set T (i.e., then $|T| = N$). With regard to the first transaction, we highlighted the vector of data (i.e., values in the set V) that will represent it in our *Multidimensional Similarity Space*.

$$T = \begin{pmatrix} \boxed{v_{1,1} & v_{1,2} & \dots & v_{1,M}} \\ v_{2,1} & v_{2,2} & \dots & v_{2,M} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ v_{N,1} & v_{N,2} & \dots & v_{N,M} \end{pmatrix} \quad (2)$$

4.1.2 Transactions Global Similarity Metric

The first metric used in our approach is the *Transactions Global Similarity (TGS)*. It is not a novel metric, since it coincides with the well known *cosine similarity* metric, which is used to measure the global similarity between two transaction vectors V_1 and V_2 (with size larger than zero). More formally, given two transaction vectors V_1 and V_2 , it is calculated as shown in the Equation 3. We normalized the result in a range $[0, 1]$, where 0 indicates two completely different vectors and 1 two equal vectors.

$$TGS(V_1, V_2) = \frac{V_1 \cdot V_2}{\|V_1\| \cdot \|V_2\|} \quad (3)$$

4.1.3 Features Local Similarity Metric

The *Features Local Similarity (FLS)* metric has been designed in the context of the proposed approach in

order to measure the similarity between transactions in terms of the weighted sequence of their features. It relies on the consideration that similar transactions are characterized by a similar weighted sequences of features. This means that, if we sort their features on the basis of their values, the obtained sequences of their original indexes will be similar in terms of *TGS* metric (i.e., *cosine similarity*). More formally, given two transactions $t^{(1)}$ and $t^{(2)}$ we calculate the *FLS* as shown in Equation 4, where $V^{(1)}$ and $V^{(2)}$ are the transaction vectors to compare and the *idx* function returns the sorted V in terms of former element indexes (i.e., the indexes of the V elements before sorting).

$$FLS(V^{(1)}, V^{(2)}) = TGS \left(idx \left(\overline{V^{(1)}} \right), idx \left(\overline{V^{(2)}} \right) \right) \quad (4)$$

with

$$\overline{V} = \{|v_1| \leq |v_2| \leq \dots \leq |v_M|\}$$

4.1.4 Features Global Similarity Metric

The *Features Global Similarity (FGS)* is another metric defined in the context of the proposed approach. Its aim is the evaluation of the global difference between two transactions in terms of their feature values, measured between corresponding features of the two transactions. It operates by following the same criterion of the *RMSE*² metric, but in our metric the obtained result has been normalized in a range $[0, 1]$. More formally, given two transactions $\hat{t}^{(1)}$ and $t^{(2)}$, the *FGS* is calculated by considering the corresponding vectors $V^{(1)}$ and $V^{(2)}$, as shown in Equation 5, where $max^{(RMSE)}$ is the maximum value assumed by *RMSE* in the context of all the comparisons between $V^{(1)}$ and all other vectors corresponding to all the transactions in the set T .

$$FGS(V^{(1)}, V^{(2)}) = 1 - \frac{RMSE}{max^{(RMSE)}} \quad (5)$$

with

$$RMSE = \sqrt{\sum_{m=1}^M \left(v_m^{(1)} - v_m^{(2)} \right)^2}$$

4.2 Criteria Formalization

A new transaction $\hat{t} \in \hat{T}$ is classified as *legitimate* or *fraudulent* on the basis of a comparison process between it and all the transactions in the set T . Such process is performed by using a threefold criterion of similarity evaluation based on the three metrics previously described in Section 4.1 and a r value experimentally defined in Section 5.4.2. More in detail,

²Root Mean Squared Error




Figure 3: Evaluation Space.

each new transaction $\hat{t} \in \hat{T}$ is classified on the basis of the following three criteria:

- (i) we define a center c in our three-dimensional space, as shown in Figure 3, by using as coordinates X , Y , and Z , respectively, $\max(TGS) - r$, $\max(FLS) - r$, and $\max(FGS) - r$, all of them calculated between the transaction \hat{t} to evaluate and all the transactions in the set T ;
- (ii) the classification of the transaction \hat{t} depends on the nature (*legitimate* or *fraudulent*) of the transactions in the set T bounded by the sphere of radius r and center c ;
- (iii) a new transaction is classified as *legitimate* if the number of legitimate transactions in T_+ bounded by this sphere is greater than that of the *fraudulent* ones in T_- , otherwise it is classified as *fraudulent*.

By way of example, Figure 3 shows a case where the evaluated transaction \hat{t} has been classified as *fraudulent*, because the number of *fraudulent* transactions in T_- bounded by the sphere of radius r and center c is greater than that of the *legitimate* ones in T_+ .

It should be noted that such evaluation process adopts a prudential criterion, since the cases with equal number of *legitimate* and *fraudulent* transactions bounded by the sphere lead toward a classification of the \hat{t} transaction as *fraudulent*.

4.3 Algorithm Formulation

The classification Algorithm 1 takes as input the set of previous transactions T , an unevaluated transaction $\hat{t} \in \hat{T}$, and the radius value r . It returns as output a *result* value that provides the classification

given to the transaction \hat{t} (i.e., a boolean value, with *true*=*legitimate* and *false*=*fraudulent*).

It should be observed that when we refer to transactions in the \hat{T} and T sets, we refer to their respective vectors composed by the values of the features (i.e., set V).

Algorithm 1: Transaction classification.

Input: T =Previous transactions, \hat{t} =Unevaluated transaction, r =Radius

Output: *result*=Transaction \hat{t} classification

```

1: procedure CLASSIFICATION( $T, \hat{t}, r$ )
2:    $cx \leftarrow (\text{getMaxTGS}(T, \hat{t}) - r)$ 
3:    $cy \leftarrow (\text{getMaxFLS}(T, \hat{t}) - r)$ 
4:    $cz \leftarrow (\text{getMaxFGS}(T, \hat{t}) - r)$ 
5:   for each  $t$  in  $T$  do
6:      $s1 \leftarrow \text{getTGS}(\hat{t}, t)$ 
7:      $s2 \leftarrow \text{getFLS}(\hat{t}, t)$ 
8:      $s3 \leftarrow \text{getFGS}(\hat{t}, t)$ 
9:     if  $(s1 \geq (cx - r) \wedge s1 \leq (cx + r) \wedge$ 
10:       $(s2 \geq (cy - r) \wedge s2 \leq (cy + r) \wedge$ 
11:       $(s3 \geq (cz - r) \wedge s3 \leq (cz + r))$  then
12:       if  $\text{getClass}(t) == \text{legitimate}$  then
13:          $lclass \leftarrow lclass + 1$ 
14:       else
15:          $fclass \leftarrow fclass + 1$ 
16:       end if
17:     end if
18:   end for
19:   if  $lclass > fclass$  then
20:      $result \leftarrow \text{true}$ 
21:   else
22:      $result \leftarrow \text{false}$ 
23:   end if
24:   return  $result$ 
25: end procedure
    
```

The classification process is performed through the Algorithm 1. It starts by calculating the max value of the *TGS*, *FLS*, and *FGT*, between the transaction \hat{t} and those of all the transactions in T , defining the cx , cy , and cz centers to use in our evaluation process (steps from 2 to 4).

From step 5 to 18 it calculates *TGS*, *FLS*, and *FGT* between each transaction $t \in T$ and the transaction \hat{t} under evaluation.

If the obtained values are, respectively, within the $cx \pm r$, $cy \pm r$, and $cz \pm r$ bounds, in the steps from 12 to 16 it increases the *lclass* (if the instance t is classified as *legitimate*) or the *fclass* (if the instance t is classified as *fraudulent*) by one unit.

At the end of the previous process, in the steps from 19 to 23 the transaction \hat{t} is classified as *legitimate* (*true* value) if the value of *lclass* is greater than *fclass*, otherwise the transaction is classified as *fraudulent* (*false* value).

The algorithm returns the classification at the step 24 through the boolean value *result*.

5 EXPERIMENTS

This section provides information on the development environment, on the adopted real-world dataset, as well as on the evaluation metrics, the followed strategy, and the state-of-the-art approach used as competitor, reporting and discussing the experimental results at the end.

5.1 Environment

Our approach has been developed in Java by using the *Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis (WEKA)*³ library to implement the competitor state-of-the-art approaches.

5.2 DataSet

This section describes the real-world dataset used for the experiments, together with the criteria used to perform this operation.

5.2.1 Description

The adopted dataset is composed by a series of credit card transactions made by European cardholders⁴. It contains the transactions made in two days of September 2013, i.e., 492 *fraudulent* transactions and 284,807 *legitimate* ones, and it represents an highly unbalanced dataset Pozzolo et al. (2015), considering that the *fraudulent* transactions are only the 0.0017% of the total.

All dataset features are provided in an anonymous form for privacy reasons, except the *Amount* and *Time* ones. The first one indicates the total amount of the transaction, while the second one the number of seconds elapsed between it and the first transaction stored in the dataset. We chose not to use the *Time* information in order to operate without any reference to the original transaction sequence.

5.2.2 Criteria

By keeping the number of *fraudulent* transactions fixed (i.e., all of them), we create several subsets with 10000, 20000, ..., 240000 *legitimate* transactions, in order to reproduce several real-world scenarios with different levels of data imbalance. Each dataset has been randomly shuffled before its use and all the experiments have been performed by following the *k-fold cross-validation* criterion described in Section 5.4.

³<http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/>

⁴<https://www.kaggle.com/dalpozz/creditcardfraud>

The characteristics of each dataset are reported in Table 2, where the size indicates the number of *legitimate* transactions and the data imbalance is expressed in terms of percentage of *fraudulent* transactions.

Table 2: Datasets.

Dataset size	Fraudulent cases (%)	Dataset size	Fraudulent cases (%)	Dataset size	Fraudulent cases (%)
10K	0.04920	90K	0.00547	170K	0.00289
20K	0.02460	100K	0.00492	180K	0.00273
30K	0.01640	110K	0.00447	190K	0.00259
40K	0.01230	120K	0.00410	200K	0.00246
50K	0.00984	130K	0.00378	210K	0.00234
60K	0.00820	140K	0.00351	220K	0.00224
70K	0.00703	150K	0.00328	230K	0.00214
80K	0.00615	160K	0.00289	240K	0.00205

5.3 Metrics

This section introduces and explains the metrics adopted to evaluate the performance of our approach and that of its competitor.

5.3.1 Specificity

The *Specificity* metric, also known as *True Negative Rate (TNR)*, is mainly driven by the number of transactions correctly classified as *fraudulent*. More formally, it is calculated as shown in Equation 6, where \hat{T} , TN , and FP are, respectively, the set of new transactions to classify, the number of transactions correctly classified as *fraudulent*, and the number of *fraudulent* transactions erroneously classified as *legitimate*.

$$Specificity(\hat{T}) = \frac{TN}{(TN + FP)} \quad (6)$$

5.3.2 F-score

The *F-score* metric represents the weighted average of the *precision* and *recall* metrics. It is largely used to evaluate the binary classifiers performance when they work with unbalanced datasets Pozzolo et al. (2015). Its result is in the range $[0, 1]$, where 1 denotes the best performance. More formally, it is calculated as shown in Equation 7, where the set \hat{T}^1 contains the predicted classifications and the set \hat{T}^2 contains the actual classifications of them.

$$F\text{-score}(\hat{T}^1, \hat{T}^2) = 2 \cdot \frac{(\text{precision}(\hat{T}^1, \hat{T}^2) \cdot \text{recall}(\hat{T}^1, \hat{T}^2))}{(\text{precision}(\hat{T}^1, \hat{T}^2) + \text{recall}(\hat{T}^1, \hat{T}^2))} \quad (7)$$

with

$$\text{precision}(\hat{T}^1, \hat{T}^2) = \frac{|\hat{T}^2 \cap \hat{T}^1|}{|\hat{T}^1|}, \quad \text{recall}(\hat{T}^1, \hat{T}^2) = \frac{|\hat{T}^2 \cap \hat{T}^1|}{|\hat{T}^2|}$$

5.3.3 Area Under ROC Curve

The *Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic* curve (*AUC*) is a metric used to evaluate the performance of a classification model Powers (2011); Faraggi and Reiser (2002). More formally, given the subsets of the previous *legitimate* transactions T_+ and the previous *fraudulent* ones T_- , it works as shown in Equation 8, where Ψ denotes all the possible comparisons between the transactions in the subsets T_+ and T_- . The result is in the range $[0, 1]$ (where 1 indicates the best performance) and it is obtained by the average of all these comparisons.

$$\Psi(i_+, i_-) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } i_+ > i_- \\ 0.5, & \text{if } i_+ = i_- \\ 0, & \text{if } i_+ < i_- \end{cases} \quad AUC = \frac{1}{|T_+||T_-|} \sum_+ \sum_- \Psi(i_+, i_-) \quad (8)$$

5.4 Strategy

This section gives some details about the criterion adopted to evaluate our approach, defining also the optimal value of the sphere radius r .

5.4.1 Cross-validation

All the performed experiments have been conducted by adopting the *k-fold cross-validation* criterion, with $k=10$. The dataset has been divided in k subsets, and each k subset has been used as test set, while the other $k-1$ subsets have been used as training set, considering as final result the average of all the obtained results.

It was made to improve the worth of the obtained results, since through this criterion we reduce the impact of data dependency. The original dataset has been divided into k subset by using an R^5 script, and the obtained training and test sets have been used to evaluate both our approach and its competitor *RF*.

The experimental results have been analyzed by using the independent-samples *two-tailed Student's t-tests* ($p < 0.05$), in order to verify the existence of a statistical significance between them.

5.4.2 Sphere Radius Definition

The Algorithm 1 previously formalized in Section 4.3 needs the definition of the radius r value, since its performance depends on it.

We obtained it by performing a series of experiments where we tested a wide range of possible values in the context of the set T , by adopting during this operation the *k-fold cross-validation* criterion described in Section 5.4.1.

⁵<https://www.r-project.org/>

The results indicate 0.026 as the optimal value of r , since it leads towards the best performance in terms of *Specificity*, *F-score*, and *AUC* metrics.

5.5 Competitor

We use *Random Forest* as the competitor approach, because the literature indicates it as the most performing one for binary classification tasks with unbalanced data Brown and Mues (2012); Bhattacharyya et al. (2011). In any case, we have nevertheless carried out a preliminary study by involving ten different state-of-the-art approaches designed to perform binary classification tasks, i.e., *Naive Bayes*, *Logit Boost*, *Logistic Regression*, *Stochastic Gradient Descent*, *Multilayer Perceptron*, *Voted Perceptron*, *Random Tree*, *K-nearest*, *Decision Tree*, and *Random Forests*.

The results shown in Table 3 confirm *Random Forests* as the most performing approach in terms of *AUC* metric, a metric able to evaluate the overall performance of the evaluation model Sobehart and Keenan (2001).

Table 3: Competitors Performance.

Approach	AUC	Approach	AUC
Naive Bayes	0.789	Logit Boost	0.796
Logistic Regression	0.794	SGD	0.747
Multilayer Perceptron	0.792	Voted Perceptron	0.713
Random Tree	0.751	K-nearest	0.764
Decision Tree	0.761	Random Forests	<u>0.799</u>

5.5.1 Parameter Tuning

Despite the fact that *Random Forests* usually gets better performance also without a preliminary tuning process, we preferred to perform this activity in order to maximize its performance.

Considering that, with respect to the *WEKA* default parameters, we get significant variations of the *Random Forests* performance only by varying the *number of randomly chosen attributes*, we tuned only this parameter.

Such activity involved both the training and test sets in order to overcome the overfitting problem, adopting the cross-validation criterion previous exposed in Section 5.4.1. The results indicates 8 as the optimal *number of randomly chosen attributes*.

5.6 Results

The experimental results are presented and discussed in this section, initially through a brief description and then with a more in-depth analysis.

5.6.1 Overview

From a first analysis of the results reported in Figure 4 arises the following general considerations:

- Figure 4.a shows that, in comparison to its competitor *RF*, the proposed *MSS* approach constantly maintains good performance in terms of *Specificity*. This indicates its capability in the detection of the *fraudulent* transactions, regardless of the number of transactions involved in the evaluation model definition and the level of data imbalance;
- Figure 4.b shows that the proposed *MSS* approach constantly maintains good performance in terms of *F-score*, differently from its competitor *RF*. This indicates its capability to reach a good balance between *Precision* and *Recall* performances, regardless of the size of data and the level of imbalance of them;
- Figure 4.c shows that also in terms of *AUC* the proposed *MSS* approach reaches and maintains good performance, with regard to its competitor *RF*. This indicates the capability of its evaluation model to work well with different data configurations, in terms of their size and level of imbalance.

5.6.2 Discussion

An in-depth analysis of the results introduced in the previous Section 5.6.1 has given rise to the following observations:

- the first observation is tied to the capability shown by our *MSS* approach to keep constant its performance, regardless of the size and the level of data imbalance. This mainly depends on its operative strategy, which is able to better characterize the transactions through a multidimensional space of evaluation less influenced by the size and the level of data imbalance;
- the second observation is closely related to the first one, because the *MSS* constancy in the performance is related to all the metrics taken into account (i.e., *Specificity*, *F-score*, and *AUC*). This represents an additional confirmation of the *MSS* capability to better characterize the transactions in our multidimensional space of evaluation based on three different similarity metrics;




Figure 4: *Specificity*, *F-score*, and *AUC* Performance.




Figure 5: *Average Performance*.

- the results in terms of *Specificity* metric, shown in Figure 4.a, indicate a better capability of the proposed *MSS* approach (with respect to its competitor *RF*) to operate in different real-world scenarios. This shows its ability to correctly classify the new *fraudulent* transactions, regardless of the number of instances available to build its evaluation model and their levels of imbalance. It should be emphasized how this aspect is crucial in a real-world scenario, where the capability to detect *fraudulent* transactions represents the primary

objective of any fraud detection system;

- the results in terms of *F-measure* metric, shown in Figure 4.b, give us an important information about our *MSS* approach for what concerns its combined performance in terms of *precision* and *recall* metrics. They indicate the *MSS* capability to properly classify the new transactions with regard to both the number of all classifications made and the number of them that should have been made;
- another observation is related to the *AUC* results. This is a metric able to evaluate the performance of a binary classifier and the results shown in Figure 4.c indicate the effectiveness of the *MSS* model of evaluation, compared to that of its competitor *RF*. In fact, it leads towards good and constant performance that is not influenced by the size and degree of imbalance of data;
- the average performance reported in Figure 5 shows how our *MSS* approach outperform its competitor *RF* in terms of all the three metrics taken into account. It follows that its adoption in real-world applications can reduce the losses related to the fraudulent use of credit cards, more effectively than its state-of-the-art competitors.

6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

Nowadays, the fraud detection approaches play a crucial role for many financial operators, since they allow them to reduce the losses related to the *fraudulent* use of the electronic instruments of payment, first of all the credit cards.

This occurs because, unlike the past, the enormous number of financial transactions carried out in the E-commerce area by using such instruments of payment no longer allows the use of manual approaches based on the human intervention.

In this context, however, it should be observed that the development of effective fraud detection approaches is not a simple task due to several well-known problems, first of all, the data imbalance in the information available to define their evaluation models.

The *Multidimensional Similarity Space* approach proposed in this paper faces this problem by analyzing the transactions in a three-dimensional space, which is defined in terms of three different metrics of similarity. Its objective is a better characterization of each transaction in one of the two possible classes of destination (i.e., *legitimate* or *fraudulent*).

The experimental results show that our approach outperforms its state-of-the-art competitor in the context of several real-world scenarios, which reproduce different size and degree of data imbalance.

Considering that the credit card fraud detection represents only one of the possible contexts where our approach can operate, a future work will be oriented to experiment it in other scenarios characterized by a high degree of data imbalance. Another interesting future work would be the experimentation of additional metrics of similarity in order to improve the effectiveness of our classification approach.

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